Abstract How does one repeatedly choose actions so as to be fairest to the multiple beneficiaries of those actions? We examine approaches to discovering sequences of actions for which the worst-off beneficiaries are treated maximally well, then secondarily the secondworst-off, and so on. We formulate the problem for the situation where the sequence of action choices continues forever; this problem may be reduced to a set of linear programs. We then extend the problem to situations where the game ends at some unknown finite time in the future. We demonstrate that an optimal solution is intractable, and present two good approximation algorithms.
Introduction
Consider the problem of repeatedly assigning two AI professors to teach two classes offered by their department each semester. One class is much harder than the other one, so during any single semester any one-to-one assignment is unfair to one of the professors. One fair solution would be for the professors to teach both classes together. But assuming this requires more overall effort than teaching the classes separately, this solution would be inefficient over the long run.
There is of course a better solution. If the two professors instead took turns teaching the hard class, then in the long run their average utilities would be more fair than in either of the one-to-one assignments and more efficient than in the sharing assignment. This is the rough idea behind long-term fairness: repeated interactions offer opportunities for improved efficiency and fairness over the single interaction scenario.
But in general the solutions will not be as simple as alternating assignments (e.g., suppose we extended the previous example with multiple assignments, involving many professors and classes).
The research presented here examines the following framework: there are a number of beneficiaries (e.g., professors), which receive different rewards from each of a finite set of actions (e.g., class assignments). The actions are chosen with replacement, and prior actions do not restrict what actions can be chosen later, or their rewards. This framework, borrowed from [23] , is very similar to the repeated normal-form game framework from game theory, except there is a single decision maker that chooses actions for the good of all beneficiaries. This means that this is not actually multiagent problem as configured. We are ultimately interested in the game-theoretic aspects of the multi-agent (that is, multiple decision maker) case, but to do so, we must first understand the single decision maker case, and as it turns out even this is nontrivial. As the literature on the single decision-maker, multiple-beneficiary case has been relatively limited, we begin there.
We define a beneficiary's utility as the average of all rewards he received in the past. We will use the term utility profile to refer to the vector of utilities (one utility per beneficiary) that the beneficiaries derive from past actions.
In order to compare utility profiles, we use a fairness concept called leximin [9, 12, 16, 19] . Leximin is a total-order relation defined as follows: a utility profile U 1 is preferable to another utility profile U 2 if the beneficiary with the minimum utility in U 1 is better-off than the minimum utility beneficiary in U 2 ; ties are broken by comparing the utilities of the the secondworst beneficiary in each utility profile, then third-worst, and so on. We choose leximin for our work because it is widely used in the literature, it is well understood, and it incorporates a certain measure of efficiency (a leximin-optimal profile is also Pareto-optimal), making it a good fit for long-term fairness.
We begin the paper by analyzing infinitely repeated games. We argue for restricting our attention to a class of sequences with optimal at-the-limit behavior and point to algorithms in the literature for finding those optimal limit points. We then discuss the more realistic case of finitely repeated games of unknown length and formulate additional requirements to a solution's transient phase. We prove that one cannot be expected to find optimal solutions in this case. We then propose two approximation algorithms and discuss their performance and possible variations. We finish with an overview of related work, conclusions and future work.
Infinite-length games
An action may give high rewards to some beneficiaries and low rewards to others, so sticking to just one action might be unfair to some beneficiaries, and thus leximin-undesirable. However, if beneficiaries receive different rewards from different actions, we may be able to improve all beneficiaries' reward averages by performing a combination of actions.
One approach to doing combinations is to use a periodic, repeated sequence of actions. In previous literature [23] , distributed algorithms for discovering such sequences found suboptimal ones. We will show optimal solutions, albeit with non-distributed algorithms.
Because beneficiaries' utilities change with every new action being performed, it is not obvious how to compare arbitrary (possibly non-periodic) sequences. Periodic sequences are thus convenient because the resulting utility profiles always converge and one can compare periodic sequences by comparing the utility profiles they converge to.
Periodic sequences are intuitively appealing, but even if one can find the periodic sequence with the best limit, that can still be suboptimal. We will show at the end of this section that in some problem instances with irrational coefficients there might exist infinite non-periodic sequences that achieve, at the limit, leximin-superior utility profiles to any utility profile achievable by a periodic sequence. Our algorithms are guaranteed to produce sequences converging to the optimal utility profile, and, whenever possible, those sequences are periodic.
In this section we will (1) argue that it suffices to focus on a specific set of "well-behaved" sequences (periodic or non-periodic) and (2) identify a subclass of those sequences with the leximin-optimal limit-point. In the following sections we will propose additional requirements to impose on this class of sequences and then provide algorithms that produce sequences satisfying these requirements.
Framework Let there be a set A of n a actions affecting a set B of n b beneficiaries through the reward functions R b : A → R, ∀b ∈ B; let S be the set of infinite sequences of actions from A:
where we use the standard notations: R, Q, and N for the set of real, rational, and natural (positive integer) numbers, respectively.
Let U be the set of all possible utility profiles (vectors) achievable from following any sequence in S for any finite number of time steps:
Note that although utility profiles U ∈ U must be reached in finite time, there is no bound on the amount of time it takes to reach them. Therefore, by following an infinite sequence of actions S, one jumps from an element of U to the another forever. Let U(S) be the sequence of utility profiles visited when one chooses the actions in the infinite sequence of actions S. Note that all terms of U(S) are contained in U.
To make things easier, we refer to the elements of A as {1 . . . n a } and the elements of B as {1 . . . n b }.
Classes of sequences and utility profiles Let S ⊂ S be the set of all sequences S where the proportions of the actions in A converge. Formally:
where S 1:t is the subsequence of S consisting of the first t elements and k is the count function (so k a (S 1:t ) = |{1 ≤ i ≤ t|S i = a}| is equal to the number of times action a is used in the first t positions of sequence S). We denote with F ∞ (S) the vector of action proportions (or fractions) S settles on (i.e., 
As a side note, we point out that there might exist sequences S ∈ S − S such that the sequence U(S) converges (i.e., it is possible that U ∞ (S) exists although F ∞ (S) does not). This might happen for instance if one "clones" action a (i.e., adds a new action a with identical rewards), then replaces some occurrences of action a in some sequence S ∈ S with a .
Let U be the set of utility vectors achievable by sequences in S in any finite number of time steps. Let U be the set of utility vectors achievable, at the limit, by sequences in S . Also, let U be the set of all limit points of sequences U(S), regardless of whether S ∈ S or S ∈ S − S . Lastly, let H denote the set of all linear combinations of actions' rewards, i.e., the convex hull of the set {U |∃a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B : U b = R b (a)}. To restate:
We will show that U = U ⊆ U = U = H, which will allow us to argue in favor of sequences in S since they achieve (in finite time or at the limit) all utility profiles any other sequence in S achieves (in finite time or at the limit).
Proof Obviously U ⊆ U since S ⊂ S. Also, U ⊆ U because ∀U ∈ U there must exist S ∈ S and τ ∈ N such that U = U (S 1:τ ), and based on S and τ it is trival to build a sequence S ∈ S that achieves U (e.g., S t = S (t−1) (mod τ )+1 ). The result follows.
Lemma 2 U ⊆ U
Proof Let U be an arbitrary utility profile in U; U is achieved by some sequence S ∈ S at time step τ ∈ N: U = U (S 1:τ ). Let S ∈ S be the periodic sequence such that
Next we show that U ⊆ H. Let S ∈ S be an arbitrary sequence with the property that the sequence U(S) converges. All terms of the sequence U(S) belong to H (it is enough to pick w a = k a (S 1:τ )/τ to prove that U (S 1:t ) ∈ H). Since H contains all its limit points (any convex hull is closed), it follows that U ∞ (S) ∈ H. Therefore, U ⊆ H, since we proved
Note that the weights w 1 , . . . , w n a in Eq. 6 constitute the coordinates of an arbitrary point in the n a -dimensional unit simplex; moreover ∀S ∈ S , F ∞ (S) also belongs to the n a -dimensional unit simplex. We will show in Theorem 6 (Appendix A) that the algorithms we propose can produce sequences S ∈ S with F ∞ (S) equal to any point in the n a -dimensional unit simplex. This is a constructive proof that H ⊆ U .
So far we proved that Proof Lemma 3 guarantees there exists a point F in the n a -dimensional unit simplex satisfying the first condition for any U ∈ U = H, so the second condition is the only point of contention.
To prove the IF part, let q a ∈ N ∪ {0} and p a ∈ N such that F a = q a p a (since F a ∈ Q). Let P the least common multiple of the p values, and let c a = q a p a × P. Since c a ∈ N ∪ {0}, it follows that U can be achieved in exactly P time steps (e.g., use the first action c 1 times, then the second action c 2 times, etc.), so U ∈ U.
The ONLY-IF part follows, since ∀U ∈ U, ∃S ∈ S and ∃τ ∈ N such that U (
to guaranteed F is inside the n a -dimensional unit simplex and both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied.
Lemma 4 proves necessary and sufficient conditions for the points in
The results in Lemma 1, Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 allow us to focus on the sequences in S and compare them based on the utility profile they converge to.
Leximin social welfare All the discussion so far was independent of one's choice of fairness measure (or more generally, social welfare). In the rest of the section we will present the specifics of using leximin to compare the utility profiles.
Problem 1 (Base Problem) Given a set A of n a actions affecting a set B of n b beneficiaries through the reward functions R b : A → R, ∀b ∈ B, find the leximin optimal utility profile in U .
We use the n a -dimensional unit simplex as a parameter space to search for max(U ), the leximin optimal utility profile in U . Once reformulated as an optimization problem over a compact and convex set, the problem can be solved with the algorithm proposed in [16] . As a computational aside, the algorithm consists of solving O(n 2 a ) linear programs (LPs), but approximate results based on a floating-point fixed-length representation might be required to make sure the complexity of this algorithm does not dominate that of the algorithms we propose here.
The algorithm produces U = max(U ), the unique [5] leximin-optimal utility vector, and F , a point (not necessarily unique) inside the unit simplex such that:
We emphasize that U is the single best utility profile any sequence can achieve in finite time or in the limit.
Example 1 Consider the professor-assignment example from the introduction: the first action corresponds to the assignment where the first professor teaches the easy class, the second action corresponds to the assignment where the second professor teaches the easy class, and the third action is the assignment where they teach the classes together:
In this example 10] , and
Example 2 Consider a variation of Example 1 where one of the professors actually gets a reward of 10 √ 2 from teaching the easy class:
In this case U =
and there is a unique F =
We revisit the existence of a periodic sequence for the optimal utility profile solution U . We claim that having all rewards rational is a sufficient condition for U ∈ U, which guarantees U can be achieved over and over by a periodic sequence. Consider that F can be computed with a finite number of arithmetic operations (e.g., by using the Simplex algorithm to handle the linear programming calls in the algorithm computing U and F ), and since the input values (rewards) are rational, so must be the output values (i.e., F ). Since the F we get has all rational coefficients, the claim follows from Lemma 4. Irrational rewards could mean (but not necessarily), that there is no F with rational coefficients, in which case there is no optimal periodic sequence.
We make the observation that even when all components in F are rational, it may take a large number of time-steps to achieve U . If F a = q a p a (in reduced form), then the smallest period is P, the least common multiple of the p values. Small changes in F can produce very large changes in the period size and the actions' multiplicities (i.e., the number of times each action is used in one period). In Example 1 F = [0.5, 0.5, 0], so P = 2 (and the first two actions have a multiplicity of 1); however an F = [0.45, 0.55, 0] implies P = 20 (first action has multiplicity 9, the second 11); while an F = [0.49, 0.51, 0] leads to P = 100 (and multiplicities of 49 and 51 for the first two actions respectively).
finding a sequence that achieves U at the limit. But in more practical applications, one must consider the implications of having the process end after a finite number of steps, or more generally, having the length of the sequence of actions drawn from some probability distribution.
Example 3
We revisit Example 1, where U = [5, 5] coincides with the optimal solution if the game lasts for an even number of steps: simply use actions 1 and 2 in equal proportions. However, action 3 is leximin-optimal if the game lasts for only one round. This shows that the optimal sequence of decisions depends on the duration of the game, and so if the duration is not known in advance, some sort of tradeoff might be required.
A risk-averse approach Given that leximin is a risk-averse fairness concept ("no one is left behind"), it makes sense to focus on a risk-averse solution approach: minimize the largest amount a beneficiary risks losing due to the game ending prematurely. 1 We define the windfall of beneficiary b at time step t while executing sequence S as the difference between the rewards accumulated by beneficiary b during the first t steps, and the amount he was entitled to, which is t × U b .
This difference is the benefit beneficiary b would get over what it was entitled to if the process stopped right after time step t. If the value is positive than it is a unearned gain (hence the term windfall); if the value is negative, then it is a loss.
We use the term worst loss (WL) of a sequence S to mean a lower bound on all windfall values, over all beneficiaries (i.e., WL ≤ Windfall b (S, t), ∀t ∈ N and ∀b ∈ B). Note that not every sequence has a constant WL. 2 When it exists, WL ≤ 0, and | WL | is an upper bound on the largest amount that any beneficiary can lose.
Our proposed solution is particularly suitable to scenarios with very large game durations, because our approach is insensitive to the distribution of game durations. Furthermore, the existence of a lower-bound for all windfall values is enough to guarantee the utilities converge to U as t → ∞ (see Theorem 5 in Appendix A).
Note that the windfalls of all beneficiaries cannot be simultaneously non-negative, unless they are all zero. Otherwise one could use the sequence of actions used up to that point to build an infinite sequence with a utility vector leximin-superior to the optimal vector U . 
Thus there must exist strictly negative windfalls during the implementation of any non-empty sequence. The only exception would be if there is some action a such that ∀b : R b (a) = U b , but that case is trivial: simply play action a at each step, with 0 windfall for each beneficiary. For convenience, we define for each action j a vector
, the amount action j changes the windfall of beneficiary b. Here are the equivalents of Eqs. 7 and 8 using the X notation:
Example 4 Let us illustrate the concept of windfall using Example 3. The X vectors are as follows: 5] , and X 3 = [−4, −4]. We will compare the following periodic action sequences (see Fig. 1 ):
Sequence S (a) makes the first beneficiary's windfall equal to 5 on odd steps and 0 on even steps, while the second beneficiary's windfall is 0 on odd steps and −5 on even ones. Therefore, the second beneficiary risks coming up 5 units short if the game stops after an odd number of steps and breaks even otherwise. Sequence S (b) has identical effects as S (a) , but to different beneficiaries, so the two are equally good. Using sequence S (c) , the second beneficiary risks losing as much as 10 units, so we prefer S (a) (or S (b) ) to S (c) .
Note that using sequence S (a) exposes the second beneficiary losses (negative windfall), while the first beneficiary is only exposed to gains (positive windfall). Although sequence S (a) is as fair as possible with respect to average utilities, one cannot help but notice a "second degree" unfairness; the sequence S (d) avoids this by alternating which beneficiary risks negative windfalls.
This leads to the following paradox: although intuitively one prefers
, the profile of worst losses for all beneficiaries during sequences S (a) or S (b) (i.e., −5 and 0) are leximin superior to the worst loss profile during S (d) (i.e., −5 and −5).
This example suggests that one might consider optimizing only the " min" of the worst loss profile, instead of leximin optimizing all beneficiaries' worst losses. However, before focusing on infinite sequences, we prove that finding finite sequences (of given length) with optimal WL is NP-hard (Theorem 4, Appendix A):
Problem 2 (Worst Loss Optimization Problem) Given the setup in the Base Problem, and λ ∈ N such that λ > |A|, find a sequence of actions S of length λ with an optimal worst loss.
Algorithms
As a consequence of Theorem 4, the best one can hope for is approximation algorithms. As part of the motivation for our algorithms, we start by showing how the most obvious heuristic produces unacceptable results.
The most intuitive solution to optimizing worst losses(s) is to try to keep all windfalls as large as possible at all times, i.e., greedily choose the action that leximin optimizes windfalls during the next step (choose the action with the best immediate effects). We will refer to this strategy as GW (Greedy leximin-optimizing next-step Windfalls). One weakness of this approach is that it assumes the game ends at the next step. In Example 1 it will always choose action 3, leading to arbitrarily bad windfalls for both beneficiaries if the game lasts long enough. Note that F 3 = 0, meaning action 3 should not be played at all. One can easily extend the greedy heuristic to ignore the "unusable" actions, but we will show that it is not enough to prevent windfalls from getting arbitrarily bad.
Example 5
We will now introduce a slightly less simplistic example, which we will use for illustration in the rest of the paper: ]. For this problem GW will choose action 1 repeatedly, leading to arbitrarily bad windfalls for the first and last beneficiaries. 3 The reason is that action 2 and 3 hurt one of those beneficiaries more than action 1 hurts any of them, and GW lacks the look-ahead to see the benefits of using actions 2 and 3.
The algorithms we propose in this paper are based on the following observation. All beneficiaries' windfalls are zero at time t if the number of times each action j was used up to time t are all proportional to the corresponding components of some F vector (i.e., k j (S 1:t ) = F j × t, ∀ j). Ideally all k j (S 1:t ) = F j × t at all times, but since the k j functions only take integer values, that is not always possible. It is intuitive that the windfalls at time t cannot get very bad if the relative counts k j (S 1:t )/t for how much each action was used up to time t are close enough to the corresponding values in F . There are many ways one can construct sequences S to keep the k j (S 1:t ) values close enough to the F j × t values; we will present two simple methods, and derive windfall upper and lower bounds for both of them.
Our methods completely ignore the actions j which are not used in F (i.e., F j = 0). Let n a be the number of actions used in F ; for simplicity, we rename the actions (reorder the dimensions of the simplex) such that all actions used in F come before the other ones:
Method 1 This method chooses an action that, so far, has been used the least relative to how often the action should have been used. Consequently, an action j can be chosen at time t + 1 if it has the smallest ratio
, where D is the sequence of decisions produced by this method. Without affecting the decision process, one can eliminate t from the denominator. We formalize this method as follows:
where k j ( ) = 0∀ j ∈ {1 . . . n a }, and is the empty sequence. Note that multiple actions could tie for the minimum.
Method 2 While the previous approach helps less-often chosen actions catch up to the others, this approach chooses actions that-if used-will get the least ahead of the others. The sequence of decisions D for this method satisfies:
We will derive windfall bounds for the first method, then use that result as a stepping stone to derive windfall bounds for the second method.
Lemma 5 ∀ j ∈ {1 . . . n a } and ∀t ∈ N:
Proof The result follows directly from Eq. 12.
Lemma 6 ∀i, j ∈ {1 . . . n a } and ∀t ∈ N:
Proof If k i (D 1:t ) = 0, then the inequality holds since the left hand side is strictly negative and the right hand side is non-negative.
If k i (D 1:t ) > 0, let t be the last time action i was used (t = max τ =1...t D τ = i). All functions k l (D 1:t ) are monotonically non-decreasing with t because ∀l ∈ {1 . . . n a } and ∀t ∈ N:
Consequently, the following must hold:
Theorem 1 Regardless of how the first method breaks the ties, the following double inequal-
ity is guaranteed to hold ∀b ∈ B and ∀t ∈ N:
We rewrote a beneficiary's windfall as a weighed sum of that beneficiary's X values. These weights change between time steps, but we can derive bounds for the values of these weights by combining Lemma 5 and Lemma 6:
The theorem follows from replacing the weights of the X values in Eq. 14 with their bounds from Eq. 15. Specifically, we lower bound a beneficiary's windfalls by using smallest weights (i.e., 0) for positive X values and largest weights (i.e., 1) for negative X values.
The converse holds for the upper bound.
Theorem 2 Regardless of how the second method breaks ties, the following double inequality is guaranteed to hold for ∀b ∈ B and ∀t ∈ N:
Proof We will prove that for any sequence D produced by the second method, any sequence S equal to the concatenation of a permutation of {1 . . . n a } with D has the property that the first method can produce S (i.e., S satisfies Eq. 12). Then we will use the bounds on windfall for sequence S (Theorem 1) to compute the windfall bounds for sequence D .
Case 1: t ∈ {1 . . . n a }. Since S starts with a permutation of {1 . . . n a }, each action is used exactly once during the first n a decisions, so k S t (S 1:t−1 ) = 0. It follows that
, so S satisfies Eq. 12 in this case. 
. Thus S satisfies Eq. 12 in this case, and, consequently, for all t ≥ 1.
The first method's windfall at time step n a is Windfall b (S, n a ) = n a i = 1 X i,b , which corresponds to a Windfall b (D , 0) = 0. After that the two methods make the same decisions, so they change the windfalls the same way (because if they both choose action j, then they both add X j to their previous windfalls). Therefore,
The theorem follows directly from applying Eq. 17 to Theorem 1.
Discussion
We proposed two methods for choosing actions such that the windfalls are always lowerbounded. While GW greedily leximin-optimizes next-step windfalls, our methods greedily optimize actions' usage frequencies (relative counts) relative to some optimal configuration F ; we will call our methods GF. Recall that the first method chooses from the actions that fell behind the most, and the second method chooses from the actions that, when picked, would get ahead the least.
Complexity The computational complexity of our algorithms is O(lg n a ) per time step. This is because one can use a heap to store actions' scores (i.e., k a (D 1:t−1 )/F a for the first method, (k a (D 1:t−1 ) + 1)/F a for the second one), since our algorithms change a single action's score at each time step.
A hybrid algorithm We denote with L B 1 and L B 2 the lower bounds on windfalls guaranteed by the two GF methods respectively.
There is an obvious way to unify the two: compute L B 1 and L B 2 ahead of time, then use the most promising method. Thus our best worst-loss guarantee is: In order to compute an approximation ratio , we need an upper bound on the optimal worst loss. Based on the fact that some action must be chosen first, it holds that WL ≤ max j min b X j,b .
Eliminating unnecessary actions
If the vector F is not unique, the particular choice of F influences both the time complexity (through n a ), and the worst loss. Each beneficiary's worst loss is bounded below by the sum of its negative X values (or the negative sum of its positive X values), so eliminating an action can only improve the worst loss.
Problem 3 (Best F Problem)
Given the setup in the Base Problem, the vector U and a value r ∈ R, is there a valid
We prove in Theorem 7 (Appendix A) that Problem 3 is NP-complete.
Theorem 3 There must always exist F such that n a ≤ n b .
Proof Carathéodory's theorem [7, 15] guarantees that any point U ∈ H ⊂ R n b can be expressed as a linear combination of n b + 1 vertices of H. U , in particular, is on the boundary of H (leximin-optimality implies pareto-optimality), so U can be expressed as a linear combination of n b vertices of H [15] . Equivalently, there exists a vector F with no more than n b positive components, and the result follows.
Based on this result, we can eliminate at least max(n a − n b , 0) actions in a preprocessing phase, thus reducing the per-step complexity to O(lg (min(n a , n b ) 
)).
We sketch a simple algorithm for this task based on a particular constructive proof for Carathéodory's theorem (e.g., [7] ). As long as n a > n b , we can use the Gauss elimination algorithm (e.g., [11] ) to find a non-trivial solution α 2 , . . . , α n a to the system of n b equations:
This is well defined, since The complexity of the Gauss elimination is O(n a n 2 b ), and there are at most n a −1 iterations, so the entire pre-process of eliminating actions can be done in O(n 2 a n 2 b ).
Breaking ties with GW
The lower-bounds on worst loss (Eqs. 18 and 19) hold even when ties are broken in the worst possible way. It may be possible to improve on those bounds by breaking ties in a productive way, but actually finding the best way to break ties is NP-hard (see the proof of Theorem 4). We propose a greedy approach: simply use GW to break ties for GF (for a time complexity of O(n b × n a ) per time step). A potentially frequent occurrence of ties is not necessarily a weakness of the GF methods. One can use the opportunity to pursue other goals while being guaranteed that the losses are held in check. For instance, one can try to address the S (a) versus S (d) paradox from Example 4. In this case one could break ties to optimize beneficiaries' cumulative windfalls (weighted by the probability the game ends that time step).
Alternatives to leximin
We discussed our algorithms in the context of leximin, but they can be used with any other social welfare measure. This is important since leximin's absolute priority to the worst-off might be too drastic for some applications [21] . Among the milder alternatives, we note ordered weighted averaging (OWA) [24] and prioritarianism [14] , where one can tune the tradeoff between leximin (fairness) and utilitarianism (efficiency). The algorithms presented in this paper require the vectors U and/or F as input. For ordered weighted averaging measures with positive, monotonically decreasing weights (which is the case for fairness), one can obtain U and F by solving a single LP (of quadratic size) [13] . When such an algorithm is missing for the social welfare measure of choice, one could use hill climbing, simulated annealing, evolutionary algorithms, etc. If an algorithm provides the U vector but not F , one can remedy the situation by solving a single LP.
Related work
The game-theoretic work in [3, 10] is concerned with finding Nash equilibria that result in alternating joint-actions (also referred to as turn-taking), but these results were tailored for specific classes of 2-by-2 games.
The starting point in our research on long-term fairness was the work in [23] on "periodic policies." Their reward model is a normal-form game, but the players are actually cooperative learning agents (rather than self-interested). The process consists of the learners playing selfishly to discover a pure Nash equilibrium, while being interrupted periodically to compare accumulated rewards. The player gaining the most (in the current Nash equilibrium and overall) has its action put off-limits until the others catch up. Alternatively [22] , after the learners discover all pure Nash equilibria, they create a periodic policy consisting of those joint actions with the fairest outcomes. In the authors' examples the players have only two actions: a highly lucrative one and a social one they fall back on while waiting for the other(s) to catch up. Both of these greedy algorithms could lead to utility profiles arbitrarily worse than the optimum.
The Worst Loss Optimization Problem is actually a variant of the Compact Vector Summation Problem [6, 18] : given a finite set of vectors X 1 , . . . , X n ∈ R m such that |V | i = 1 X i = 0, one must find a permutation π of {1, 2, . . . , n} that minimizes max 1≤k≤n
In the earliest such work · was the Euclidian norm, so the problem consisted of ordering the vectors such that the path resulting from adding vectors one by one stays inside a minimum-radius m-dimensional circle centered at the origin. Later research has focused on results general enough to accommodate arbitrary norms (intuitively a norm is a function associating a "size" value to every vector).
We believe that Sevat'janov's algorithm [18] is the most relevant algorithm to compare with our own for two reasons. First, it has the best guarantee and time complexity we are aware of in the Compact Vector Summation Problem literature. Second, it accommodates "asymmetric norms." This is particularly relevant because the function we try to optimize can be rearranged as an asymmetric norm but not a norm. 4 We will show next that, compared to Sevat'janov's algorithm, our approach is faster and its guarantees are never worse (although they are sometimes significantly better).
Guarantee comparison Sevat'janov's algorithm guarantees that no loss will be worse than
), where M = max 1≤k≤n X i (i.e., M is the largest absolute value of any negative component of any X vector). We claim that L B 1 ≥ −M(n a − 1). This follows from Eq. 18, replacing every negative X i,b with −M, and noticing that for any given beneficiary b at most n a − 1 of b's X values can be negative. 5 Therefore, our worst loss,
), the guarantee of Sevast'janov's algorithm.
Complexity comparison Sevast'janov's algorithm has a complexity of O(n 2 m 2 ), because it picks a vector n − m times, and each such operation has a complexity of O( km 2 ), where k is the number of alternatives (k = n, . . . , n − m). An iteration in Sevast'janov's algorithm has the same complexity as an iteration in our preprocessing phase (they are both based on Gauss elimination). However, the number of iterations in Sevast'janov's algorithm is at least the number of iterations in our preprocessing phase (each action has at least multiplicity 1). Therefore, the time complexity of our preprocessing phase cannot be larger than that of Sevastianov's algorithm. More importantly, even if that algorithm were extended to benefit from our preprocessing phase and to explicitly deal with multiplicities (i.e., k = n a ), its complexity would still be O(n a n 2 b ) per time step, which is higher than the complexity of our algorithms (even when breaking ties with GW).
In summary, by eliminating unnecessary actions and only keeping track of multiplicities, we are able to offer worst case guarantees that are never worse than (and sometimes much better than 6 ) Sevast'janov's. Further, arguably, our algorithms are elementary. 4 Maximizing the worst loss is equivalent to minimizing the largest absolute value of any negative coordinate of any partial sum of X vectors. This function is an asymmetric norm, but not a norm, since it satisfies the triangle inequality ( y + z ≤ y + z ) and positive definiteness ( y = 0 ⇒ y = 0), but it only satisfies the scalability condition ( ky = |k| × y ) for positive scaling factors [4] . 5 From Eq. 9 it follows that for any beneficiary b, if there exists i ∈ {1 . . . n a } such that X i,b < 0 then there must exist j ∈ {1 . . . n a } such that X j,b > 0. 6 Our results are superior whenever there are X values different from M and M . In Example 6 our methods guarantee a worst loss of −76 and −64 respectively, while Sevat'janov's algorithm guarantees a worst loss of approximately −112 (−128 using the X = −X formulation), since M = −60 and M = −64. Moreover, the −112 bound is achieved only if one is willing to deal with reversing the action sequence; in this case the period length is 15 (F = [ 4 15 , 6 15 , 5 15 ]), but in general it can be arbitrarily long.
Conclusions and future work
In this paper we studied the problem of achieving certain long-term fairness guarantees in a simple repeated-game setup: (1) all beneficiaries are entitled to their socially-optimal utilities and, (2) no matter when the game ends, all beneficiaries are guaranteed to have received close to what they were entitled to that point. We proved that finding an optimal solution with respect to the second guarantee is NP-hard and proposed two efficient approximation algorithms.
Certain issues remain to be resolved before the work proposed here can be applied in a truly multi-agent framework. When each beneficiary is involved in the decision process (i.e., a player), one may need special utility functions for players (e.g., the "home egualis" model [23] ) in order for some notion of fairness to emerge. Players must also stick to the long-term policy every step of the way [3, 10] , [17, Folk Theorem, p. 124] .
We intend to focus on the middle ground between the singe decision-maker case (studied here) and the case where each beneficiary is a decision maker. We are interested in multiple agents working together to optimize social welfare of a population of beneficiaries (in urban traffic control, for instance, the agents are traffic lights and the cars are beneficiaries [1] ). In order for actors to deal with dynamic sets of beneficiaries, we will have to make our algorithms on-line. We have shown here that myopically optimizing next-step fairness is detrimental in the long-run, and so some planning-ahead must carry over to those algorithms.
A Additional theorems Theorem 4 Problem 2 is NP-hard.
Proof We prove Problem 2 is NP-hard through a reduction from Partition Problem [8] . In the Partition Problem one is given a multiset V of positive integer numbers and has to decide if V can be partitioned into two subsets whose elements sum to the same value. We will show that the answer to this decision problem is "YES" if and only if the optimal worst loss for a corresponding Worst Loss Optimization Problem instance is equal to a specific value.
For an arbitrary Partition Problem instance V = {v 1 , . . . , v |V | }, the associated Worst Loss Optimization Problem instance has |V | + 1 actions and |V | + 3 beneficiaries. We differentiate between two types of beneficiaries. We refer to the first |V | + 1 beneficiaries as b 1 . . . b |V |+1 , and to the last two as b and b . The rewards are presented in the following table: 
where σ is the sum of elements in V (i.e., σ = |V | i = 1 v i ), and δ is an arbitrary constant. The computational effort for the transformation is obviously linear in the size of the input.
We will show that we can solve any instance of the Partition Problem by solving the corresponding Worst Loss Optimization Problem instance and analyzing the windfalls for the first |V | + 1 steps of the optimal-WL sequence. Specifically, we map the sequence of actions into a partition (V , V − V ) of V such that all actions used before action a |V |+1 correspond to elements in V , and the actions used after action a |V |+1 correspond to elements in V − V . We use the first |V | + 1 beneficiaries to ensure that each action is used exactly once during the first |V | + 1 steps (proof follows shortly). Additionally, we use beneficiaries b and b to associate the sums of elements in V and V − V with windfalls.
The 
, which is a contradiction. Also, if action a j were not used at all during the first |V | + 1 positions of S then some other action a i had to be used more than once, leading to the same contradiction.
Given that each action is used exactly once in the first |V | + 1 steps,
is the sum of at most one negative term (i.e., − σ 2 ) and several positive ones (i.e., σ 2×|V | ). As for the beneficiaries b and b , their worst losses depend on the subset V of elements in S that go before the first occurrence of action a |V |+1 .
The windfall of beneficiary b decreases monotonically from zero until action |V | + 1 is chosen, then abruptly becomes positive and thereafter decreases monotonically to zero. Thus the worst loss for beneficiary b occurs right before action a |V |+1 :
The worst loss for beneficiary b occurs immediately after action a |V |+1 , since
, concluding the proof for the first part of the claim.
We now prove the ONLY-IF part of the claim: if there exists a partition of V into V and V − V such that v∈V v = v∈V −V v, then there exists a sequence of length λ with a worst loss of − σ 2 . Let S be a periodic sequence whose period consists of an arbitrary permutation of the actions in {a i |v i ∈ V } followed by action a |V |+1 and an arbitrary permutation of the actions in {a i |v i ∈ V − V }. Because S is periodic, the sequence of windfalls produced by S is also periodic. Therefore, it is enough to verify that windfalls are greater than or equal to − σ 2 during the first |V | + 1 time steps. Note that each action is used exactly once during the first |V | + 1 steps, so we can verify the worst loss for each beneficiary using arguments similar to those in the first part of the claim's proof. There is a single action a j that affects beneficiary b j 's windfall in a negative way, so Windfall b j (S, t) ≥ − Therefore, the answer to any instance of the Partition Problem can be decided by solving the corresponding Worst Loss Optimization Problem instance. To summarize: compute the windfalls for the first |V | + 1 steps of the optimal-WL sequence. If at any time some windfall was strictly less than − σ 2 , then the partitioning is impossible; otherwise make a multiset V consisting of all v j such that action a j was encountered before action a |V |+1 , and return the partition (V , V − V ).
The transformations between the two problems are obviously polynomial in the size of the input, so we conclude that the existence of a polynomial time algorithm for the Worst Loss Optimization Problem implies P = N P.
Let us assume U(S) does not converge to U ; it follows that ∃ > 0 such that ∀t , ∃ f (t ) > t such that U (S 1: f (t ) ≥ . Since the sequence U(S) must have an infinite number of terms at least away from U , we can build a subsequence consisting exclusively of such terms (i.e., at least away from U ). This leads to a contradiction, because such a subsequence cannot possibly have a subsequence converging to U . The result follows. Proof We start by noting that F a = 0 implies k a (D 1:t ) = 0, since we never use action a if F a = 0, so the result holds for those actions.
We now focus on the actions with strictly positive F values. It follows from Lemma 6 that:
∀i, j ∈ {1 . . . n a } and ∀t ∈ N : k i (D 
Theorem 7 Problem 3 is NP-hard.
Proof For this proof we use a reduction from Partition Problem [8] . Given a multiset of positive integer numbers V = {v 1 , . . . v |V | }, we associate a problem with 2|V | + 1 actions (a 1 , . . . , a n , a 1 In this construction we reuse some elements from the previous NP-completness proof (Theorem 4). We associate actions with the elements v i ∈ V and we use beneficiaries b + , b + , b − , b − to map sums of elements from V into worst losses. The novel element is that we associate two actions (a i and a i ) with each v i ∈ V so that multiple F vectors exist. We also use action a σ and beneficiaries b +i and b −i to force the solver to choose only one of a i and a i when choosing an F vector. We map F into a partition of V by grouping together all v i elements for which F chose to use a i over a i . 
Claim There exists an equal-sum partition for V if and only if

